Detection of mortality clusters associated with highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry: a theoretical analysis by Savill, Nicholas J. et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detection of mortality clusters associated with highly pathogenic
avian influenza in poultry: a theoretical analysis
Citation for published version:
Savill, NJ, Rose, SGS & Woolhouse, MEJ 2008, 'Detection of mortality clusters associated with highly
pathogenic avian influenza in poultry: a theoretical analysis' Journal of the Royal Society Interface, vol 5, no.
29, pp. 1409-1419. DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2008.0133
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1098/rsif.2008.0133
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Journal of the Royal Society Interface
Publisher Rights Statement:
Free in PMC.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Detection of mortality clusters associated
with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
in poultry: a theoretical analysis
Nicholas J. Savill*, Suzanne G. St. Rose and Mark E. J. Woolhouse
Centre for Infectious Diseases, Ashworth Laboratories,
Institute of Immunology and Infection Research, University of Edinburgh,
The King’s Buildings, West Mains Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, UK
Rapid detection of infectious disease outbreaks is often crucial for their effective control.
One example is highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) such as H5N1 in commercial
poultry ﬂocks. There are no quantitative data, however, on how quickly the effects of HPAI
infection in poultry ﬂocks can be detected. Here, we study, using an individual-based
mathematical model, time to detection in chicken ﬂocks. Detection is triggered when
mortality, food or water intake or egg production in layers pass recommended thresholds
suggested from the experience of past HPAI outbreaks. We suggest a new threshold for
caged ﬂocks—the cage mortality detection threshold—as a more sensitive threshold than
current ones. Time to detection is shown to depend nonlinearly on R0 and is particularly
sensitive for R0!10. It also depends logarithmically on ﬂock size and number of birds per
cage. We also examine how many false alarms occur in uninfected ﬂocks when we vary
detection thresholds owing to background mortality. The false alarm rate is shown to be
sensitive to detection thresholds, dependent on ﬂock size and background mortality and
independent of the length of the production cycle. We suggest that current detection
thresholds appear sufﬁcient to rapidly detect the effects of a high R0 HPAI strain such as
H7N7 over a wide range of ﬂock sizes. Time to detection of the effects of a low R0 HPAI
strain such as H5N1 can be signiﬁcantly improved, particularly for large ﬂocks, by lowering
detection thresholds, and this can be accomplished without causing excessive false alarms
in uninfected ﬂocks. The results are discussed in terms of optimizing the design of disease
surveillance programmes in general.
Keywords: avian inﬂuenza; mathematical model; surveillance
1. INTRODUCTION
Surveillance is at the centre of any strategy in the
prevention, control and eradication of human, livestock
and wild animal infectious diseases (Weinberg 2005;
King et al. 2006). With the increasing emergence of
new infectious diseases into often large naive popu-
lations, the rapid detection and characterization of
these diseases is crucial in preventing potentially
catastrophic epidemics. Four examples where the lack
of early detection has caused socially and economically
disastrous epidemics are foot-and-mouth disease in the
UK in 2001 (Anderson 2002; Haydon et al. 2003), SARS
in East Asia in 2003 (Ho & Su 2004), highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) H7N1 in Italy in 1999 (Capua &
Marangon 2000) and HPAI H7N7 in The Netherlands
in 2003 (Elbers et al. 2004a). In particular to HPAI, the
escalating number of epidemics of HPAI viruses in
domestic poultry around the world, the endemicity of
H5N1 virus in poultry in southern China (Li et al. 2004)
and its potential mutation into a human transmissible
form have heightened the awareness of rapid detection
of infection in poultry and humans (Ferguson et al.
2004; Food and Agriculture Organisation and World
Organisation for Animal Health 2005; Kuiken et al.
2005; Capua & Alexander 2006).
At present, there is little quantitative understanding
of how long it takes to detect the effects of HPAI
infection in commercial poultry ﬂocks, and how such
time to detection is affected by various factors such as
ﬂock size, species, age and housing. It is important to
know this for several reasons. First, in an epidemic
situation, it is vitally important to trace contacts
between farms on which infection has been notiﬁed and
farms that are at risk of infection. Fast and efﬁcient
tracing of contacts is essential in the combat of such
diseases. Knowing the temporal window during which a
farm is infectious focuses limited resources on tracing
farms at risk. Second, national planning for disease
control requires a good understanding of disease
dynamics on farms in order to inform models of the
transmission dynamics between farms. Some key
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parameters for such models are time to detection and
farm latent and infectious periods, all of which can be
inferred from well-parametrized mathematical models.
HowHPAI infection is detected in a ﬂock will depend
on how rapidly the disease kills clinically apparent
birds. If death is sudden with little or no clinical signs,
then rapidly rising mortality may be the ﬁrst indication
that something is amiss. If clinical signs are more
apparent, then decreased food and water intake or
reduced egg production in layers may be the ﬁrst
indication. Deciding whether something is wrong with a
ﬂock is made difﬁcult by the day-to-day variation in
bird deaths, food and water usage and egg production.
Even in healthy commercial poultry ﬂocks, a small
number of deaths are expected. Typical daily mortal-
ities are approximately 0.01–0.15% (McMullin 2006;
Elbers et al. 2007).
To guide the decision of whether to consult veter-
inary practitioners and inform the authorities, several
thresholds have been recommended in The Netherlands
as a temporary precaution due to HPAI outbreaks in
Italy (Elbers et al. 2004a) and during and after the
severe HPAI outbreaks in The Netherlands in 2003
(Elbers et al. 2004a, 2005, 2007). Currently, the
recommended thresholds for chickens are (Elbers
et al. 2007)
— greater than 0.5% mortality over two consecutive
days for ﬂoor-reared layers and broilers,
— greater than 0.25% mortality over two consecutive
days for caged layers, and
— food or water intake or egg production in layers down
5% over two consecutive days.
An additional weekly mortality detection threshold
of 3% was instigated by the Dutch authorities during
and after the 2003 outbreak (Elbers et al. 2004a).
There are two important constraints on setting
the level of a detection threshold. First, they should not
be too high otherwise they could lead to infections going
unnotiﬁed for several critical days.Thekey to controlling
avian inﬂuenza—as well as many other human and
animal infectious diseases—is rapid reporting so that
control measures can be quickly implemented. Second,
they should not be too low otherwise false alarms in
uninfected ﬂocks will occur. Too many false alarms
would overstretch diagnostic laboratories, thus creating
long waiting times for critical test results. This situation
needs to be avoided, especially during an epidemic.
The aim of this paper is to study, using mathemat-
ical models, the relationship between detection
thresholds and false alarm rate in uninfected ﬂocks
and the trade-off between lowering detection thresholds
to speed detection in infected ﬂocks and increasing false
alarm rate in uninfected ﬂocks.
During this work, it became clear that the above
detection thresholds were not able to detect infection
rapidly in caged systems. In such systems, it is likely
that infection will be detected when many birds appear
dead within a single cage (Tsukamoto et al. 2007). The
above detection thresholds are generally too insensitive
to pick up such cases. Therefore, in addition to the
above thresholds, we include a fourth which we call
the cage mortality detection threshold. This threshold
is deﬁned as at least one cage containing more than
a given proportion of dead birds. Later in this paper we
suggest a value for this proportion.
Note that we are assuming in this paper that detec-
tionmeans farmers becoming aware of a problem in their
ﬂocks.The period fromwhen a farmer becomes aware of a
problem to when the authorities declare an HPAI
infection is subject to a completely different set of issues,
as exempliﬁed by other HPAI epidemics (Capua &
Marangon 2000; Elbers et al. 2004a; Tsukamoto et al.
2007), and ones we will not consider here.
2. METHODS
2.1. Relationship between detection thresholds
and false alarm rate in uninfected ﬂocks
A mortality detection threshold gives the minimum
proportion of birds that must die within a given number
of days to trigger detection. Let a be that minimum
proportion and T the number of days. If the ﬂock size
is N birds, then the minimum number of birds that
must die is aN, where aN is rounded up to the nearest
integer. Assuming that the daily background rate
of bird deaths, b, is constant over a production cycle,
then the probability of a bird dying in T days is
1Kexp(KbT ). The probability of aN birds dying in T
days is given by the binomial distribution with
parameters N and pZ1Kexp(KbT ). We require the
probability, P(a, T, b, N ), of at least aN deaths in T
days; this is given by 1KD(aNK1; N, 1Kexp(KbT ))
where D is the binomial cumulative density function.
First, consider the weekly mortality detection
threshold aw. Mortality is calculated each day over
the last 7 days. Therefore, if the production cycle lasts
C days, then mortality is calculated CK6 times during
the production cycle. The expected number of false
alarms during the production cycle, fw, is therefore
ðCK6ÞPðaw;T Z 7; b;NÞZ fw: ð2:1Þ
Given C, aw, T, b and N, it is a simple matter to
calculate fw using the regularized incomplete beta
function. We also want to solve the equation for aw
given fw. This cannot be done analytically, and so a
numerical technique is required. In this paper, we use
the bisection method with a tolerance of 10K10.
For the daily mortality detection threshold ad,
mortality has to be greater than some threshold on
two consecutive days. Thus, the value of the threshold
that causes fd false alarms per production cycle is found
by solving the equation
ðCK1ÞP2ðad;T Z 1; b;NÞZ fd: ð2:2Þ
In caged systems, the death of most birds within an
infected cage will be readily detected. We propose a
cage mortality detection threshold ac, such that if there
are n birds per cage, then the death of more than acn
birds in a single cage will trigger detection. Deaths of all
birds within a cage are likely to occur in less than a
week. Therefore, the value of the threshold that causes
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fc false alarms per production cycle is found by solving
the equation
ðCK6ÞPðac;T Z 7; b;N ZnÞZ fc: ð2:3Þ
2.2. Individual-based model of HPAI
transmission in infected ﬂocks
The model we use for HPAI transmission in infected
ﬂocks is the same as in previous work (Savill et al.
2006). It is an individual-based model. Each bird has
parameter values randomly chosen from appropriate
distributions, and we track the infection status of each
bird. Birds are assigned a latent period, an asympto-
matic period, a symptomatic period and infectiousness
rates for virus excreted in faeces and exhaled. All model
parameters are given in table 1.
In terms of the model, ﬂoor-reared birds are a special
case of caged birds with just one cage.
The status of the birds and the infectiousness of
faeces are updated every hour. At hour 0, we assume
that a small amount of infective faeces (equal to the
amount of infective faeces one bird excretes in an hour)
enters a single cage in a caged system or is deposited on
the ﬂoor in a ﬂoor-reared system. The rate of infection,
ri , of susceptible bird i in cage j is given by bird
susceptibility multiplied by the infectiousness of
infective faeces and airborne virus in that cage and
divided by the number of birds per cage (thus assuming
frequency-dependent transmission), i.e.
riZ s$
Tf;jCTa;j
n
; ð2:4Þ
where s is bird susceptibility; n is the number of birds
per cage; Tf, j is the infectiousness of infective faeces in
cage j; and Ta, j is the infectiousness of airborne virus
in cage j. Bird susceptibility, s, is set to 1 with no loss of
generality if we assume susceptibility to infection via
the faecal–oral and respiratory routes is the same.
Our simulations assume frequency-dependent trans-
mission. Density-dependent transmission would lead to
R decreasing as birds die during the outbreak because
birds would experience fewer contacts. However,
because very few birds die before detection, the change
Table 1. Model parameters and their values.
parameter description H5N1 H7N7
viral subtype parameters
L minimum duration of latent period
in hours
24; Shortridge et al. (1998) 24; van der Goot et al. (2005)
mean duration of latent period in hours 36 48
maximum duration of latent period
in hours
48 72
A minimum duration of asymptomatic
period in hours
24; Shortridge et al. (1998) 94; van der Goot et al. (2005)
mean duration of asymptomatic period
in hours
33 151
maximum duration of asymptomatic
period in hours
42 209
S minimum duration of symptomatic
period in hours
6; Shortridge et al. (1998) 0; van der Goot et al. (2005)
mean duration of symptomatic period
in hours
6 12
maximum duration of symptomatic
period in hours
6 24
pS probability of clinical signs 0.5; Shortridge et al. (1998) 1; Elbers et al. (2007)
mf mean infectiousness of virus excreted
in faeces in 1 hour
0.0027; derived from Tiensin et al.
(2007)
0.067; derived from van der Goot
et al. (2005)
ma mean infectiousness of airborne virus
excreted in 1 hour
0.00027; derived from Tiensin et al.
(2007)
0.0067; derived from van der
Goot et al. (2005)
d percentage reduction in faeces infec-
tiousness per hour
5%; Shortridge et al. (1998) 5%; Shortridge et al. (1998)
ﬂock and housing parameters
b daily background mortality 0.05%; McMullin (2006) and Elbers et al. (2007)
z f dispersal distance (number of cages) of
infective faeces
1; this paper
za dispersal distance (number of cages) of
airborne virus
1; this paper
detection threshold parameters
c times per day birds are checked 2
ad daily mortality 0.5%; Elbers et al. (2004a)
aw weekly mortality 3%; Elbers et al. (2005)
ac cage mortality 50%; this paper
as clinical signs 5%; Elbers et al. (2004a)
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in R would be negligible. Hence, our results would
not be affected if we had chosen density-dependent
transmission instead.
Once bird i becomes infected, it is latent (asympto-
matic and non-infectious) for Li hours. It then becomes
asymptomatic and infectious for Ai hours. We assume
that the infectiousness of birds is constant throughout
the infectious period. At the end of the asymptomatic
period, birds have a probability pS of becoming sympto-
matic, otherwise they die. Symptomatic bird i is
infectious for Si hours and then dies. We assume that
dead birds are not infectious. We consider two cases of
HPAI for which we have some data: H5N1 and H7N7.
H5N1 is characterized by rapid death within 2–4 days
with few apparent clinical signs before death and virus
excretion 1 day after infection (Shortridge et al. 1998;
Tsukamoto et al. 2007). With very little other data to
proceed on, we assume that a bird’s latent period in
hours is randomly drawn from the distribution 24C
Binomial(24, 0.5) that gives a minimum latent period of
24 hours, amaximum of 48 hours and amean of 36 hours
(table 1). A bird’s asymptomatic period in hours is
drawn from the distribution 24CBinomial(18, 0.5).
Birds have a 50% chance of showing clinical signs—
reduced food or water intake or egg production in
layers—and if they do, they die after 6 hours. A more
detailed quantitative analysis of the H7N7 virus
from the Dutch 2003 epidemic has established that the
latent period in chickens is approximately 1–2 days
(modelled as 24CBinomial(48, 0.5)) and the infectious
period is 6.3 days with a 95% CI from 3.9 to 8.7 days
(modelled as 94CBinomial(115, 0.5); van derGoot et al.
2005). Elbers et al. (2007) noted that infected farms
in the Dutch 2003 epidemic experienced some reduced
food and water intake the day before mortality began
to rise. We therefore allow all birds to become sympto-
matic with the symptomatic period distributed as
Binomial(24, 0.5).
At the beginning of a simulated hour, we reduce the
infectiousness of infective faeces, Tf, in all cages by a
proportion d. The default value of d models the loss of
infectiousness in wet faeces at 258C (Shortridge et al.
1998). We next calculate the infectiousness of any new
faeces that have been excreted by all infectious birds in
each cage, which, for cage j, is given by
T newf;j Z
X
i2infectious bird in cage j
Ef;i; ð2:5Þ
where Ef,i is the infectiousness of faeces excreted by
infectious bird i in 1 hour.
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Figure 1. (a) Expected number of false alarms per production cycle against daily mortality detection threshold for various
background daily mortality rates for a ﬂock of 10 000 birds and production cycle of 365 days. (b) The values of the daily mortality
detection threshold against ﬂock size that give one false alarm per 1000 production cycles for various background daily
mortality rates and a production cycle of 365 days. (c) The values of the daily mortality detection threshold against the length of
the production cycle that give one false alarm per 1000 production cycles for various background daily mortality rates and a ﬂock
of 10 000 birds. (d ) The values of the daily mortality detection threshold against daily background mortality rate that give one
false alarm per 1000 production cycles for various ﬂock sizes and a production cycle of 365 days. (a–c) Black solid line, 0.01%
background daily mortality rate; red dashed line, 0.05%; green dot-dashed line, 0.1%; blue double dot-dashed line, 0.2%.
(d ) Black solid line, 1000 birds; red dashed line, 10 000; green dot-dashed line, 100 000.
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Faeces are spread equally among neighbouring cages
a distance zf cages away. We have no estimate for how
far faeces can be spread in caged ﬂocks; we assume
spread to only contiguous cages, although faeces could
be moved farther distances on egg belts and feed tracks,
for example. It is known that the spread of infection is
slower in caged systems than in ﬂoor-reared systems
(Shortridge et al. 1998; Sims et al. 2003a; Elbers et al.
2007; Tsukamoto et al. 2007).
Also, at the beginning of each simulated hour,
we calculate the infectiousness of airborne virus
exhaled in each cage. Virus exhaled by birds in cage j
is given by
T newa;j Z
X
i2infectious bird in cage j
Ea;i; ð2:6Þ
where Ea,i is the infectiousness of airborne virus
excreted by an infectious bird i in 1 hour. Airborne
virus is assumed to spread equally among neighbouring
cages a distance za cages away.
We assume that airborne virus is less infectious than
that in faeces (Shortridge et al. 1998; Tsukamoto et al.
2007). There is no quantitative estimate for the relative
infectiousness of these transmission routes, so we
assume that transmission via faeces is 10 times more
likely than through inhalation. (Analysis not shown
here demonstrates that our results are insensitive to
transmission route.) We assume that Ef,i and Ea,i vary
among birds. Their true distributions are unknown, so
we assume that they are normally distributed with
means mf and ma and standard deviations 0.25mf and
0.25ma, respectively. The results in this paper are robust
to the width of these distributions. We use an estimate
of R0Z2.5 for H5N1 (Tiensin et al. 2007) and R0Z208
for H7N7 (van der Goot et al. 2005) to determine mean
faeces infectiousness.
The ﬂock is checked cZ2 times per day, once in the
morning and once in the evening. A tally of dead birds is
kept. Detection can occur in the following ways.
—Mortality greater than ad in two consecutive 24 hour
periods.
—Mortality greater than aw within the last 168 hours.
—Reduction in food or water intake or egg production
in layers of as over two consecutive days. This is
found by dividing the number of symptomatic birds
by the number of birds alive.
—A single cage with at least acn dead birds.
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Figure 2. Expected number of false alarms per production
cycle against weekly mortality detection threshold for various
background daily mortality rates (black solid line, 0.01%; red
dashed line, 0.05%; green dot-dashed line, 0.2%; blue double
dot-dashed line, 0.5%) for a ﬂock of 10 000 birds and
production cycle of 365 days.
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Figure 3. (a) Expected number of false alarms per production
cycle against cage mortality detection threshold for various
numbers of birds per cage (black solid line, 5; red dashed line,
10; green dot-dashed line, 20; blue double dot-dashed line, 40;
yellow dot-dashed line, 80), a background mortality of 0.05%
and a production cycle of 365 days. (b) The values of the cage
mortality detection threshold against birds per cage that give
one false alarm per 1000 production cycles for various
background daily mortality rates (black solid line, 0.01%;
red dashed line, 0.05%; green dot-dashed line, 0.1%; blue
double dot-dashed line, 0.2%) and a production cycle of
365 days.
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As well as death by infection, birds also die of other
causes at a rate b per day. McMullin (2006) noted
mortality rates between0.05and0.1%perday forbroilers
and 0.014% per day for breeding birds and commercial
layers. Elbers et al. (2007) estimated a mean mortality
of 0.03% for caged layers, 0.04% for organic layers, 0.07%
for broilers, 0.04% for up to 11-week-old turkeys and
0.1% for greater than 15-week-old turkeys.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Relationship between detection thresholds
and false alarm rate in uninfected ﬂocks
We ﬁrst examine the relationship between false alarm
rate and the daily detection threshold in uninfected
ﬂocks. Figure 1a shows the expected number of false
alarms per production cycle as the daily mortality
detection threshold is varied for different background
mortality rates and a ﬂock size of 10 000 birds (equation
(2.2)). The most striking result is the sensitivity of false
alarm rate to the detection threshold. Taking a back-
ground mortality of 0.05% as an example (red dashed
line), for detection thresholds up to 0.093%, a ﬂock is
expected to have at least one false alarm during its
production cycle. To achieve, say, a 1000-fold reduction
in false alarm rate to 0.1% only requires the threshold to
rise to 0.13%. This graph demonstrates that setting a
detection threshold high enough makes the chance of
a false alarm negligible; setting it slightly too low and
false alarms become very frequent. The current
recommended threshold of 0.5% means that false
alarms will never happen for typical background
mortality and for a ﬂock of 10 000 birds. Note that
these and the following results are independent of the
characteristics of any AI subtype because we are
examining uninfected ﬂocks.
For illustrative purposes, we ﬁx the false alarm rate
at 1 per 1000 production cycles, and examine how the
threshold varies with ﬂock size (ﬁgure 1b), length of
production cycle (ﬁgure 1c) and background mortality
rate (ﬁgure 1d ).
Figure 1b shows the daily mortality detection
threshold such that the false alarm rate is 1 per 1000
production cycles for varying ﬂock size and background
mortality rates. As ﬂock size increases and back-
ground mortality decreases, the minimum threshold
drops. For a given ﬂock size and background death rate,
a threshold above the curve will give less than one
false alarm per 1000 production cycles and a threshold
below the curve will give more than one false alarm per
1000 production cycles. Thus, the currently rec-
ommended threshold of 0.5% would cause more than
one false alarm per 1000 production cycles for ﬂocks
with less than approximately 1000 birds and typical
background mortalities of 0.05%. The discontinuities in
the curves are not artefacts or numerical errors; they
are due to the detection threshold ad, which is a
continuous parameter, being transformed into a dis-
crete number of birds, i.e. adN.
Figure 1c shows that daily mortality detection
thresholds (for one false alarm per 1000 production
cycles and a ﬂock size of 10 000 birds) is insensitive to
the length of the production cycle. This is because the
number of false alarms during a production cycle is
linearly related to the length of the production cycle,
and a linear change in false alarm rate (at approx. 1 per
1000 production cycles) can be accomplished with very
small changes to the detection threshold (ﬁgure 1a).
Figure 1d shows the sensitivity of the daily mortality
detection threshold against background mortality for a
false alarm rate of 1 per 1000 production cycles and
varying ﬂock sizes. For small background death rates
(typical of commercial poultry ﬂocks), the detection
threshold for a given false alarm rate rises approxi-
mately linearly with the background death rate.
We next turn to the weekly mortality detection
threshold. Figure 2 shows the expected number of false
alarms per production cycle as the weekly mortality
detection threshold is varied for different background
mortality rates and a ﬂock size of 10 000 birds. The
qualitative results are the same as for daily mortality
detection thresholds except that the thresholds are, of
course, higher. All the results that apply to the daily
mortality detection threshold similarly apply to the
weekly threshold.
Finally, we examine the cage mortality detection
threshold. Figure 3a shows how the false alarm rate
depends sensitively on the cage mortality detection
threshold for various numbers of birds per cage (usually
between 5 and 80 birds) and a background mortality of
0.05%. The fewer birds per cage, the higher the
threshold required to maintain a given false alarm
rate. A threshold of 50% gives one false alarm per 1000
production cycles for ﬁve birds per cage. We propose
that this could be used as a potential threshold value.
Figure 3b shows how the cage mortality detection
threshold changes for varying number of birds per cage
such that the false alarm rate is 1 per 1000 production
cycles for different background mortality rates. The
threshold increases approximately linearly with the
background mortality rate for a given number of birds.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis of time to detection
in infected ﬂocks
In this section, we analyse how the mortality and
symptoms detection thresholds affect the time to
detection in commercial poultry ﬂocks infected with
either H5N1 or H7N7. Furthermore, we explore
whether time to detection can be improved by lowering
detection thresholds without compromising false alarm
rate in uninfected ﬂocks.
Figure 4a shows how time to detection varies with
daily mortality detection threshold for different ﬂock
sizes (1000–100 000 birds) and a background mortality
rate of 0.05% in H5N1-infected ﬂocks. For a given
threshold, time to detection rises logarithmically with
ﬂock size. This is owing to the longer time it takes for a
certain proportion of the birds to die given the same
initial infection of a small amount of infective faeces as
ﬂock size increases. At the current recommended
threshold (shown by the vertical dotted line), ﬂocks of
1000 birds are detected around day 5 post-infection,
whereas ﬂocks of 100 000 birds are detected around day
25 post-infection. The black dashed lines demarcate
1414 Avian inﬂuenza surveillance N. J. Savill et al.
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regions of different false alarm rates in uninfected ﬂocks
(calculated using equation (2.2)). At the current
recommended threshold, ﬂocks of 1000 birds have a
false alarm rate of approximately 10K6. Larger ﬂock
sizes have much smaller false alarm rates.
The main result one can draw from ﬁgure 4a is that
the daily mortality threshold can be lowered from its
current recommended value while still keeping false
alarm rate negligible. This is particularly true for larger
ﬂocks: time to detection for ﬂocks of 100 000 birds can
be improved from 25 days to approximately 10 days
while keeping the false alarm rate less than 1 in 1000 per
production cycle.
Time to detection versus weekly mortality detection
threshold exhibits quantitatively and qualitatively
similar results as for the daily mortality threshold
(ﬁgure 4b). It might appear strange that detection can
occur in less than a week. However, the deﬁnition of the
weekly threshold is greater than 3% mortality within a
week. In our simulations, such high rates of mortality
often occur within a single day. Such a rapid rise
in mortality is often observed in HPAI outbreaks
(Bean et al. 1985; Barr et al. 1986; Capua & Marangon
2000; Sims et al. 2003b; Selleck et al. 2003; Ellis
et al. 2004; Kwon et al. 2005; Department of the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2007; Elbers et al.
2007; Tsukamoto et al. 2007). Note that combining
detection thresholds does not act synergistically to
improve detection. Detection occurs whenever the ﬁrst
threshold is passed.
Timetodetection forH7N7(ﬁgure4d,e) is lessvariable
than for H5N1 due to its higher estimated R0. Improve-
ments in time to detection, by reducing detection thres-
holds, are therefore less pronounced; for example, only a
day or two’s improvement for ﬂocks of 100 000 birds.
Time to detection using only the symptoms detec-
tion threshold takes very much longer than with
mortality thresholds for H5N1 due to the short
symptomatic period (ﬁgure 4c). Even for H7N7,
where we have assumed that most birds show clinical
signs, time to detection is several days longer than
with mortality thresholds (ﬁgure 4 f ). This is not
surprising given that the recommended symptoms
threshold is 10 times less sensitive than the daily
threshold. Presumably this threshold was set so high
owing to the greater daily variation in food and water
intake and egg production, compared with daily
variation in mortality.
Figure 5a shows the time to detection of H5N1 in
caged birds versus the cage mortality detection
threshold. For ﬁve birds per cage, time to detection is
approximately 4 days and is almost independent of the
cage mortality detection threshold. However, for 80
birds per cage, time to detection rises from 4 days for a
less than 10% mortality threshold to 60 days at an 80%
mortality threshold. Moreover, time to detection can be
signiﬁcantly improved without compromising on false
alarms; for all the numbers of birds per cage, time to
detection can be reduced to approximately 4 days while
still maintaining a false alarm rate of less than 10K6 per
production cycle.
For H7N7 in caged birds, there is less change in time
to detection with cage mortality detection threshold
due to its higher estimated R0 than H5N1. As for ﬂoor-
reared birds, there is only a few days’ improvement in
time to detection as the detection threshold is reduced.
A whole host of factors related to virus subtype, host
species, management practices and housing units,
density and conditions (Tsukamoto et al. 2007) not
considered in this paper determine R0. Instead of
varying speciﬁc factors to determine their effect on time
to detection, we can simply vary R0 via changes in
faeces infectiousness. Figure 6 demonstrates that time
to detection is independent of R0 for ﬂoor-reared ﬂocks
of approximately 1000 birds and for caged birds with
less than approximately 20 birds per cage. For larger
ﬂock sizes and more birds per cage, detection can vary
from days to weeks depending on the value of R0. For a
given R0, the longer time to detection of H7N7
compared with H5N1 is due to its longer latent and
infectious periods.
4. CONCLUSION
HPAI outbreaks have been increasing in frequency over
the past 10 years resulting in the deaths of millions of
poultry and huge economic losses for affected countries
(McLeod et al. 2005). Surveillance systems of avian
inﬂuenza in wild and domestic birds have thus become
internationally important front line tools in preventing,
detecting, controlling and eradicating epidemic and
endemic diseases in poultry (Capua & Alexander 2006).
In this paper, we have focused on the use of
surveillance to detect the effects of HPAI infection on
commercial poultry ﬂocks, namely rapidly rising
mortality, clinical signs, reduced food and water intake
and reduced egg production in layers. It is important
that detection and conﬁrmation by virus isolation occur
as rapidly as possible as amply demonstrated by the
H7N1 HPAI outbreak in Italy in 1999 (Capua &
Marangon 2000) and the H7N7 HPAI outbreak in The
Netherlands in 2003 (Elbers et al. 2004a), and the
successful control of many H5N1 incursions into Asia
and Europe in recent years.
To aid detection and reporting, several ﬂock-level
mortality and symptoms thresholds have been estab-
lished by the Dutch authorities (Elbers et al. 2004a,
2005, 2007). We analysed the relationship between the
values of these thresholds and the rate at which they
cause false alarms in uninfected ﬂocks due to back-
ground levels of mortality. We show that the false
alarm rate is sensitive to the various detection
thresholds. The implication is that it is better to set a
detection threshold slightly too high rather than too
low.We show that for a given false alarm rate (e.g. 1 per
1000 production cycles), detection thresholds vary in a
nonlinear fashion with ﬂock size and number of birds
per cage and background mortality rate, but are
insensitive to the length of the production cycle.
We examined how quickly the effects of HPAI
infection can be detected in commercial poultry ﬂocks
with three different mortality detection thresholds and
a symptoms detection threshold. Floor-reared birds are
detected by mortality passing either a daily or weekly
mortality detection threshold. Time to detection
depends logarithmically on ﬂock size. This is the case
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when the initial contamination is small, for example
infective faeces brought into a ﬂock on someone’s
clothing. For a large contamination, for example by
contaminated food or water, time to detection may be
more rapid and independent of ﬂock size.
Our analysis indicates that current recommended
thresholds could be lowered in order to shorten time to
detection in ﬂoor-reared birds. For H7N7, which has a
high estimate of R0 of 208 (van der Goot et al. 2005),
approximately 12–24 hours can be gained without
compromising on false alarms in uninfected ﬂocks. For
H5N1, which has a much lower estimate of R0 of
approximately 2.5 (Tiensin et al. 2007), time to
detection can be improved by days, or even a few
weeks for large ﬂock sizes, without compromising on
false alarms.
Although we included a detection threshold for
clinical signs, clinical signs were never detected before
rising mortality in our simulations. This is not
surprising since the daily and weekly mortality detec-
tion thresholds are 10 times more sensitive than the
symptoms threshold. In fact, using clinical signs as a
detection threshold is problematic. Clinical signs of
HPAI are extremely variable, depending on species,
age, virus subtype and the presence of other diseases.
Infected birds may die with no obvious signs or they
may show many diverse clinical signs (Elbers et al.
2004b). This dramatic variation would introduce too
much error into detection and probably contribute to
an increase in false alarms. Elbers et al. (2007) reported
that a decrease in food or water intake was often seen in
H7N7-infected ﬂocks a day before rising mortality was
observed, although at what level was not noted. They
suggested that the observation of clinical signs within a
ﬂock should trigger closer scrutiny of the ﬂock in order
to respond rapidly to rising mortality if it occurs.
During this work, we realized that the recommended
detection thresholds were too insensitive to trigger
early detection in caged systems. We therefore rec-
ommend an additional mortality detection threshold
for caged systems. The reason a cage mortality
detection threshold is more sensitive than other
thresholds is that deaths are spatially clustered in a
small subgroup of the ﬂock and are therefore easier to
observe. A value of approximately 50% dead birds in a
single cage should be easily detected in commercial
caged ﬂocks and prevents excessive false alarms in
uninfected ﬂocks (ﬁgure 2). Time to detection is
generally faster than in ﬂoor-reared ﬂocks because
most early deaths occur in small easily monitored cages
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rather than a large open area containing thousands of
birds. As for ﬂoor-reared birds, time to detection can
be improved by lowering the detection threshold
without compromising on false alarms. For H7N7, we
predict an improvement of only a few days when there
are more than approximately 20 birds per cage and
there is little improvement at lower densities. For
H5N1, we predict that very little improvement can be
made for less than approximately 20 birds per cage;
however, several weeks can be taken off time to
detection for higher densities.
Our results indicate that time to detection is
sensitive to changes in R0 for R0!10 and relatively
insensitive above 10 (ﬁgure 6); the smaller R0 is, the
longer detection takes. However, for low R0, time to
detection is also sensitive to mortality detection
thresholds, particularly for larger ﬂock sizes in ﬂoor-
reared birds and high numbers of birds per cage in
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caged systems; thus, by lowering detection thresholds,
we predict that time to detection can be improved by
days or even weeks without compromising on false
alarms in uninfected ﬂocks. WhenR0 is high, we predict
that time to detection can be improved by only a day or
two, and only then for large ﬂock sizes or high numbers
of birds per cage.
There have been two recent H5N1 outbreaks in the
UK both in turkeys: one in January 2007 and another
in November 2007. The epidemiological investigation
of the January outbreak found that a shed of 7119
turkeys became infected somewhere between 22 and 25
January. Some birds were ‘off colour’ on 27 January and
mortality was 0.18, 2.2 and 12% on 30 January, 31
January and 1 February, respectively. Disease was
notiﬁed on 1 February. Based on current recommended
mortality thresholds, notiﬁcation occurred on the
appropriate day. Our model predicts that detection
would have occurred approximately 11–12 days post-
infection in chickens, or approximately during the week
beginning 4 February: at least 3 days after actual
detection. This discrepancy could be because turkeys
are generally more susceptible to AI compared with
chickens (Tumpey et al. 2004; Balicer et al. 2007).
Alternatively, multiple turkeys may have been initially
infected as the route of infection was likely to have
been contaminated wild birds or rodents entering the
shed. Unfortunately, the epidemiological investigation
of the November outbreak was unable to trace the
source of infection. This meant there was no estimate of
when the turkeys were initially infected.
Although reducing the detection thresholds to
improve time to detection is theoretically possible, in
practice there are some difﬁculties. To calculate
thresholds for a certain false alarm rate for a particular
ﬂock is not simple. However, pre-printed tables or
graphs such as in ﬁgure 2 can be easily referred to in a
commercial situation. Moreover, we have assumed a
constant death rate of birds over a production cycle,
which implies that the number of bird deaths is
binomially distributed. In reality, chickens and layers
have a peak in mortality in the ﬁrst week post-hatch
and thereafter layer mortality tends to be low
throughout rear and production with a slight rise as
the birds age. Chicken mortality tends to rise again
more rapidly towards week 5 in the production cycle.
However, it is feasible that detection thresholds can be
adjusted throughout the production cycle to take these
predictable variations into account.
In reality, the use of mortality detection thresholds
may not be strictly adhered to by farmers. Elbers et al.
(2007) have noted that some farmers still ignore the
early detection system put in place during the H7N7
epidemic in The Netherlands. Moreover, rising
mortality can be caused by other avian diseases and
stress conditions leading to a hesitation to notify.
Notwithstanding this, the results we describe here have
relevance in informing the implementation of an early
detection system. It gives policy makers a quantitative
and scientiﬁc base on which to make decisions on
surveillance and control. It feeds into mathematical
models of between-ﬂock transmission that are used to
inform contingency planning, and contact tracing in an
epidemic can be reﬁned based on our estimates of time
to detection.
Elbers et al. (2007) have highlighted the necessity
for good quantiﬁcation of mortality with respect to ﬂock
size as a means for rapid diagnosis of AI. We whole-
heartedly agree with this sentiment, and would add that
more and better quantiﬁcation and reporting of all
aspects of poultry rearing and key epidemiological para-
meters such as latent and infectious periods and
transmission rates are paramount for developing
evidence-based surveillance, control and prevention
strategies.
Figure 6 highlights and reiterates that imperfect
prophylactic vaccination that reduces R0 to just above
1 can have serious consequences for disease control
(Savill et al. 2006). Time to detection can be signiﬁ-
cantly increased compared with non-vaccinated birds
with much higher R0. This suggests that disease could
spread through ﬂocks undetected for many weeks
before mortality rises above the threshold. This
makes between-ﬂock transmission much more likely
and control of an epidemic orders of magnitude more
difﬁcult. It may also increase the risk of transmission
to humans.
This work also has more general implications. The
problem of detecting HPAI infection in commercial
poultry ﬂocks illustrates the principle that, for any
disease detection system based on proxy indicators (e.g.
mortality clusters), the optimal design is a function of
the demography and structure of the host population.
Quantitative approaches such as those developed here
are therefore likely to be useful in informing the design
of surveillance programmes for emerging infectious
diseases in any host population, including humans.
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